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MODELING FINANCIAL SYSTEM WITH INTERBANK FLOWS,
BORROWING, AND INVESTING
ADITYA MAHESHWARI AND ANDREY SARANTSEV
Abstract. In our model, private actors with interbank cash flows similar to, but nore general
than (Carmona, Fouque, Sun, 2013) borrow from the outside economy at a certain interest
rate, controlled by the central bank, and invest in risky assets. Each private actor aims to
maximize its expected terminal logarithmic utility. The central bank, in turn, aims to control
the overall economy by means of an exponential utility function. We solve all stochastic
optimal control problems explicitly. We are able to recreate occasions such as liquidity trap.
We study distribution of the number of defaults (net worth of a private actor going below a
certain threshold).
1. Introduction
We are interested in modeling interaction between utility-maximizing private actors (which
for simplicity we call private banks or simply banks) and a central bank, which regulates
borrowing activity via an interest rate. Private banks exchange (exogenous) cash flows, and
borrow from the general economy to invest in profitable but risky assets. This central bank
can lower interest rate to stimulate financial activity by private actors, or increase this rate
to cool this activity down. Sometimes, however, there are not many profitable investments.
Then the private actors do not borrow at all, while the central bank is not able to remedy
this even by lowering the rate to zero; this is called liquidity trap.
We use the utility maximization approach: private actors borrow and invest to maximize
their logarithmic utility, and the central bank applies its own exponential (which is sometimes
referred to as CARA = constant absolute risk aversion) utility function to a certain variable
which measures the size of the entire financial system. The utility functions are chosen so
that the central bank (interested in stability of the system overall) is more risk-averse than
private actors (interested only in their own net worth). Because of the special choice of utility
functions, we are able to solve all corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations explicitly.
Logarithmic utility, as shown in [13], corresponds to myopic decision-making; in other words,
private actors are short-sighted. The central bank is more risk-averse, and sometimes it needs
to reduce overall risk by reducing the interest rate.
We mention the concept of systemic risk, which can be informally described as the proba-
bility of a large number of banks defaulting or getting into financial trouble. We understand
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2 ADITYA MAHESHWARI AND ANDREY SARANTSEV
default or failure of a bank as its net worth (assets minus liabilities) going below a given
threshold. We are interested in probability of this undesirable event; of the mechanism of
such failure; and of the financial contagion, when failure of a few banks leads to many more
failures. We refer the reader to the handbook [15] containing many different approaches to
systemic risk. Our work is inspired by the model introduced in [8] and also described in [5,
Section 5.5].
If Xi(t) is the wealth and Yi(t) := logXi(t), authors in [8] model the banking system as a
system of N continuous-time stochastic processes Y1, . . . , YN , with multidimensional Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck dynamics. The stochastic differential equations are given by:
(1) dYi(t) = a
(
Y (t)− Yi(t)
)
dt+ σdWi(t), i = 1, . . . , N,
with i.i.d. Brownian motions W1, . . . ,WN , constants a, σ > 0, and
(2) Y (t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Yi(t), t ≥ 0.
The constant a is referred to as the interbank flow rate. In [8], these mean-reverting drifts
are generated by the decisions of banks to borrow money from one another. Their decisions
are done by minimizing a certain cost functional, which measures, roughly speaking, the
preference of a bank to borrow from other banks, as opposed to borrowing from the central
bank. Authors discuss both the finite player solution and the mean-field limit of the problem
in the context of systemic risk.
An important observation: Apply Itoˆ’s formula to rewrite equations (1) in terms of Xi (the
actual net worth of the ith bank) instead of Yi = logXi. Then the interbank flows derived
from Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-type terms a(Y (t) − Yi(t)) dt do not add up to 0. One can think
that the remainder comes from (or to, depending on the sign) the real economy. Nevertheless,
the model (1) attracted a lot of attention because of its simplicity and analytical tractability.
In this article we shall build on it, extending these Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-type terms to be
heterogeneous; see below.
We further explore the individual decision-making of the private banks and extend the role
of the central bank. Furthermore, we analyze how this decision-making affects the stability
of the system. More specifically, we extend the model by assuming that each private bank
invests in a risky portfolio of assets, borrows money from the general economy to invest in
this portfolio (with interest rate controlled by the central bank), pockets the profit, and pays
back the interest.
Unlike [8], where the decision making of the central bank is not analyzed, in our model the
central bank uses interest rate as a policy tool (to govern the behavior of the private banks).
It is derived as a solution of the control problem solved by the central bank.
We assume two kinds of players in our model: private banks and the central bank. Private
banks want to maximize the terminal logarithmic wealth:
(3) supE [logXi(T )] = supE [Yi(T )] , i = 1, . . . , N,
through borrowing and investing in the portfolio of risk assets. For simplicity, we assume
the portfolios of private bank to be correlated geometric Brownian motions. The choice of
logarithmic utility function allows us to solve the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation explicitly.
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On the other hand, the central bank wants to control the overall size of the financial system,
using interest rate r > 0 as a monetary policy instrument, which measures how attractive it
is for banks to borrow and invest, as opposed to sitting on cash. As we see in Section 4, this
interest rate r controls the overall size of the system, measured by Y from (2). This is not the
average net worth of banks; this is the average of the logarithms of net worth. This measure
is somewhat non-standard; however, it is more appropriate for our model, when dynamics
in (1) is written in terms of logarithms Yi of net worths Xi. This measure is used in [8] and
subsequent papers, so we feel justified in using it here. The central bank chooses r to maximize
terminal expected exponential utility (sometimes in the literature it is called CARA: constant
relative risk aversion):
(4) E
[− exp(−λY (T ))] for some λ > 0.
This corresponds to the central bank being even more risk-averse than private banks: Private
banks have utility function which is linear in Yi(t), and the central bank has utility function
which is concave in these variables. As for the private actors, we can solve the corresponding
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation explicitly and find the optimal interest rate r. This is due
to the special choice of
Given the choice of the interest rate r, we can solve the stochastic optimal control problem
explicitly for each player: private banks and the central bank. This is due to the special
choice of logarithmic utility function for private banks in (3), and for the central bank in (4).
For other choices of utility function, it is probably impossible to solve this optimal control
problem explicitly. Then one could try to use mean-field limits, as in [9, 10, 21]. This topic is
left for future research.
This setup somewhat resembles the principal-agent problem: the principal (now the central
bank) allows private banks to borrow from the economy, and private banks (agents) maximize
their expected logarithmic terminal utility (their contract).
Under such optimal choices of the actors, we study the dynamics of logarithmic net worth
of banks, and the distribution of defaults. A default of the ith bank is understood in the
same way as above: when Xi(t), the net worth of this bank, falls below some fixed positive
threshold. This leads us to understanding systemic risk in this model: how defaults of a few
banks can lead to defaults of many other banks, see subsection 3.4.
Besides incorporating the optimal strategy of the central bank, we also generalize the
model (1) by allowing interbank flow rates from bank i to bank j to depend on the banks i, j,
and on time t, denoting this rate by cij(t):
(5) dYi(t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
cij(t) (Yj(t)− Yi(t)) dt+ dWi(t).
Here, we assume that the flow rates satisfy
cij(t) = cji(t), i 6= j; cii(t) = 0, i = 1, . . . , N.
This heterogeneity, together with Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics, resembles to some extent the
model by [20]. As we see in Section 4, the matrix (cij(t)) of interbank flow rates corresponds
to the stability of the system. We also allow for Brownian motions W1, . . . ,WN to have drifts
and to be correlated: that is, we assume W = (W1, . . . ,WN) is an N -dimensional Brownian
motion with drift vector µ and covariance matrix A.
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The observation made above for (1) can be applied for (5): If we rewrite these equations
using Itoˆ’s formula in terms of Xi (the actual net worth) instead of Yi = logXi, then the
interbank flows do not add up to 0. As before, one can think that the remainder comes from
the real economy. But we shall build on the model (1) from [8], which attracted a lot of
research interest because of its tractability and lucidity.
To summarize, the topic of this paper is optimal decisions of private banks, and interaction
of these individual decisions with each other, as well as with that of the central bank. Systemic
risk is a consequence of the optimal decision making of both the central bank and the private
banks in the economy.
1.1. Contributions. Our work here is inspired by [8], however, unlike them, we consider
utility maximization for both the central bank and the private banks. We first solve for the
optimal investment of the private banks in their portfolios of assets, given the interest rate
set by the central bank. Next, we turn around and find the optimal interest rate for the
central bank, given the strategy of the private banks and its own risk aversion. Unlike in [8],
where the interbank flow rate was constant, here we generalize the flow rates to be different
for each pair of private banks. We consider dependence of the distribution of defaults on the
correlation between risky assets, and on the interest rate set by the central bank.
1.2. Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we describe the model in terms of stochastic
control problem for a system of stochastic differential equations. In Section 3, we solve the
stochastic control problem for each private bank, and in Section 4, for the central bank (given
optimal control for each private bank). In particular, in Section 3, we study distribution of
the number of defaults. This is where we touch the concept of systemic risk: We are interested
in its dependence on the parameters of the system, for example correlations between various
risky investments. Section 5 contains results on long-term stability of the system: the fact
that the capitals of banks tend to stay close, as opposed to splitting into two or more groups.
Section 6 is devoted to concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. The Appendix
contains some technical proofs.
1.3. Review of related models. The fundamental wealth dynamics (1) of this model has
been studied under different settings. For example, in [7], a similar system was studied with
time delay. Large deviations were studied in [16]. Without attempting to give an exhaus-
tive survey, let us mention the following papers, which use stochastic differential equations
and interacting Brownian particles to model dynamics of capitals of banks or other financial
agents. [14] use a system of stochastic differential equations with Bessel-type diffusion coef-
ficients to model simultaneous defaults (in this model, a default is when the capital reaches
zero). Authors in [3, 27] combine such Bessel-type diffusion coefficients with a mean-field-
type drift term, with [3] having an additional jump term (therefore the processes there are
jump-diffusions).
In the paper [25], the financial system is modeled by independent geometric Brownian
motions, with defaults happening at hitting times of some lower threshold. Once a bank
defaults, other banks see their capital decrease by a certain amount, possibly triggering a
cascade of defaults. [6] introduce mean-field game of timing. The term game of timing refers
to a game where each player chooses an optimal stopping time. Mean-field game of timing is
when a player competes against a “crowd” of other agents, instead of individual competitors;
this can be informally viewed as a limit of games of timing as the number of players tends to
infinity. This models a bank run, continuing the research in a celebrated paper [11].
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Let us also mention the paper [22], which models the dynamics by geometric Brownian
motions, studying mean-field relative performance criteria: An agent competes against a
“crowd”. We maximize the agent’s performance compared to the performance of the “crowd”.
In a recent paper [4], banks are organized in clusters. The interbank transactional dynamics
is modeled through a set of interacting measure-valued processes. Implications of shocks
arising in a cluster are studied.
1.4. Notation. For a vector or a matrix a, its transpose is denoted by a′. We usually think
of vectors as column-vectors. The dot product of two vectors a and b is denoted by a · b. The
term standard Brownian motion stands for a one-dimensional Brownian motion with drift
coefficient 0 and diffusion coefficient 1. For V ≡ 1, this is called the total variation norm. Fix
a dimension N ≥ 2. Then e ∈ RN is a vector (1, . . . , 1)′ with unit components, and we define
the following hyperplane in RN :
Π := {x ∈ RN | x · e = 0} = {x ∈ RN | x1 + . . .+ xN = 0}.
Define the (closed) ball of radius r on Π centered at the origin:
(6) B(r) := {x ∈ Π | ‖x‖ ≤ r}.
The (N−1)-dimensional Lebesgue measure on Π is denoted by mesΠ(·). As mentioned above,
the symbol 1(A) or 1A stands for the indicator function of an event A.
2. Description of the model
2.1. Formal description. Consider a system of N agents (we call them private banks) which
continuously lend money to each other, borrow from the outside economy, pay back the
interest, and invest in some risky portfolios.
We operate on filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) with the filtration satisfying the
usual conditions. All the processes which we consider are adapted to the (Ft)t≥0. Let Xi(t) > 0
be the net worth (assets minus liabilities) of the ith bank at time t, for i = 1, . . . , N . Let Zi(t)
be the amount borrowed at the moment t by the ith private bank from the outside economy.
Assume the interest rate for such borrowing is r(t) ≥ 0, controlled by the central bank. Then
during the time interval [t, t+ dt], the ith bank pays back interest r(t)Zi(t) dt. At time t, the
ith bank has at its disposal the amount Xi(t) +Zi(t): its own capital plus borrowed amount.
This amount Zi(t) ≥ 0 is controlled by the ith bank.
Alternatively, the ith bank might decide to not borrow anything, and instead to even put
aside some of its own money in cash (which does not earn any interest). This happens if the
investment is not very profitable, or, more precisely, if the return does not outweigh the risk.
In this case, we let Zi(t) < 0, and define −Zi(t) to be the quantity of cash put aside. The
amount invested is still Xi(t) + Zi(t), but the bank does not pay or receive any interest.
We combine these two cases: the ith bank invests the amount Xi(t) + Zi(t) at time t into
a risky portfolio, and pays interest r(t)(Zi(t))+ dt during the time interval [t, t+ dt].
At time t, the ith bank invests in a portfolio of risky assets with value Si(t). The ith bank
buys (Xi(t) + Zi(t))/Si(t) units of this portfolio. Net profit for the time interval [t, t+ dt] is
(Xi(t) + Zi(t))
dSi(t)
Si(t)
.
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Combining all of the above, we get the following system of equations:
(7) dXi(t) = (Xi(t) + Zi(t))
dSi(t)
Si(t)
− r(t)(Zi(t))+ dt i = 1, . . . , N, and Xi(0) > 0.
Next, we make some assumptions on Si, the dynamics of the portfolio processes. A separate
question is how banks construct these portfolios out of stocks and other risky assets. This
question is separate from the topic of this paper, and we shall not study it here. Instead, we
assume that these are geometric Brownian motions. This assumption is very simplifying, but
we believe it captures to some extent the features of portfolios. The processes
Mi(t) =
∫ t
0
dSi(s)
Si(s)
, i = 1, . . . , N,
form an N -dimensional Brownian motion with drift vector µ = (µ1, . . . , µN) and covariance
matrix A = (aij)i,j=1,...,N . In particular, each Mi, i = 1, . . . , N , is a Brownian motion with
drift coefficient µi and diffusion coefficient σ
2
i := aii, so it can be represented as
(8) Mi(t) = µit+ σiWi(t),
where Wi is a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion. Although the portfolio process (8)
is driven by only one Brownian motion, a more general representation:
(9)
dSi(t)
Si(t)
= µidt+
m∑
j=1
σi,jdBj(t),
where (B1, . . . , Bm) are Brownian motions, can also be considered in our framework. Since
σidWi(t) :=
∑m
j=1 σi,jdBj(t), but Wi is also a Brownian motion, we fall back to the original
portfolio process (8).
The covariance between Brownian motions (W1, . . . ,WN) can be modeled in various ways.
(1.a) All W1, . . . ,WN , are independent. Then the matrix A is diagonal:
(10) A = diag(σ21, . . . , σ
2
N).
This means that the portfolios of banks are independent.
(1.b) All W1, . . . ,WN , are the same: W1 = W2 = . . . = WN . This means that all banks,
in fact, use the same portfolio, and they are perfectly correlated. Then it makes sense to let
µ1 = . . . = µN and σ1 = . . . = σN .
(1.c) An intermediate case: for some i.i.d. Brownian motions W˜i, i = 0, . . . , N , and some
coefficients ρ0, ρ˜0 with ρ
2
0 + ρ˜
2
0 = 1 we have:
(11) Wi(t) := ρ0W˜i(t) + ρ˜0W˜0(t), i = 1, . . . , N.
One can also split N banks into subsets and construct dependence as in Case (1.c) for each
subset; portfolio processes corresponding to different subsets are assumed to be independent.
2.2. Main system of driving stochastic equations. Apply Itoˆ’s formula to find the dy-
namics of Yi(t) := logXi(t):
(12) dYi(t) =
dXi(t)
Xi(t)
− d〈Xi〉t
2X2i (t)
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Combining (7) with (12), we get our main stochastic equation, driving banks’ wealth. For
now, it does not contain interbank flows, which are Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-type drifts as in (1)
or (5):
(13) dYi(t) = (1 + αi(t))σi dWi(t) + hi(αi(t), r(t)) dt.
Here we define the relative investment ratio:
αi(t) =
Zi(t)
Xi(t)
, t ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N,
and the following quantity:
(14) hi(α, r) := (1 + α)µi − σ
2
i
2
(1 + α)2 − rα+ for α, r ∈ R.
Finally, the ith bank also interacts with other banks, having cash flow in and out. In [8] and
subsequent papers, this interaction is modeled by Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-type drifts
(15) a(Y (t)− Yi(t))
from (1), with Yi(·) = logXi(·). Here, we take drifts
(16)
1
N
N∑
j=1
cij(t)(Yj(t)− Yi(t))
from (5), which are more general than (15), and add them to (13). Note that in our model,
as in [8], the cash flows (in the original scale, not logarithmic one) do not necessarily add up
to zero. Consider possible particular cases:
(2.a) All cij(t) ≡ 0. Then there are no cash flows between banks.
(2.b) All cij(t) ≡ c(t) > 0. For a constant c, this is the model from [8].
(2.c) Let G be a graph on vertices {1, . . . , N}. Then
(17) cij(t) = c(t)1(i↔ j) for some c(t) > 0.
After superimposing these Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-type drifts from (16) on top of (13), our
main driving equation takes the form
dYi(t) = (1 + αi(t))σi dWi(t) + hi(αi(t), r(t)) dt
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
cij(t) (Yj(t)− Yi(t)) dt, i = 1, . . . , N.
(18)
Equation (18) resembles the model from [8]. However, it also has significant differences: the
volatility in (18) can be controlled, unlike in [8]; and the drift coefficient in (18) is a bit more
complicated. For homogeneous rates: cij(t) ≡ c(t), the equation (18) takes the form
dYi(t) = (1 + αi(t))σi dWi(t) + hi(αi(t), r(t)) dt+ c(t)(Y (t)− Yi(t)) dt,(19)
for i = 1, . . . , N , where Y (t) is defined in (2).
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2.3. Interpretation. As in [8], we consider bank i to be in bankruptcy at time t if Xi(t) < e
D,
where D is a given threshold, stipulated by the central bank. The central bank would like to
stimulate the activity of banks by persuading them to take risks, but not too much, lest they
may become bankrupt. Equation (13) means that the central bank can use interest rate r(t)
as a monetary policy tool to alter the behaviour of the private-banks.
Assume that banks start borrowing too much money and investing them in risky assets
(leveraging). By doing this, they increase their probability of default. Then the central bank
can raise this interest rate to discourage private banks from excessive borrowing. Conversely,
if banks are too cautious in borrowing against future profits and risk-taking, then the central
bank can stimulate them by lowering the interest rate. As we see later, this interest rate
affects the overall state of the system.
The parameter r(t) is determined by the central bank and given to all private banks. These
private banks then determine the investment rates αi(t), independently of each other. In light
of decision-making of the banks, the central bank needs to determine optimal values of these
parameters. This setup is similar to the principal-agent problem, but with many agents.
3. Optimal behavior of private banks
3.1. Statement of the problem. We assume that the ith bank takes as given the capital
of other banks: Xj(t), j 6= i (or, equivalently, Yj(t) := logXj(t), j 6= i), as well as the interest
rate r(t) (the instrument of the monetary policy). The bank is trying to choose the relative
investment ratio αi(t), or, equivalently, the amount borrowed Zi(t), to maximize its expected
terminal logarithmic wealth:
(20) sup
αi
E [logXi(T )] ,
where the supremum in (20) is taken over all bounded adapted controls αi = (αi(t), 0 ≤ t ≤
T ). Assume that the interest rate r(t) is already set by the central bank. In this section, we
solve this stochastic control problem explicitly. This corresponds to the agent’s problem in
the principal-agent framework. In the next section, we discuss the optimal policy choices of
the central bank (the principal).
3.2. Solution of the problem. This specific choice of the utility function, which is linear
in Yi, and the interbank flows, which are also linear in Yi in (13), makes this optimization
problem tractable: We can solve this explicitly.
Theorem 3.1. For the optimization problem stated in (20), where αi is bounded, adapted on
[0, T ], the following value of αi is optimal for the ith private bank:
(21) α∗i (t) :=

(
µi−r(t)
σ2i
− 1
)
+
, µi ≥ σ2i ;
µi
σ2i
− 1, µi ≤ σ2i .
Remark 1. In particular, if µi ≤ σ2i , that is, the return on the investment does not outweigh
its risks, then the ith bank does not borrow anything to invest. On the contrary, this bank
sets aside money as cash. If µi ≥ σ2i , the investment is attractive for borrowing, but a high
enough interest rate: r(t) ≥ µi − σ2i can preclude the ith bank from borrowing; then this
bank will invest only its own money into the portfolio. Only if the interest rate is low enough:
r(t) < µi − σ2i , the ith bank borrows money to invest.
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Remark 2. Note that the optimal strategies (21) do not depend on the flow rates cij, because
of the special choice of logarithmic utility function, which is linear in Yi. Although logarith-
mic utility function leads to myopic agents, this assumption is important for mathematical
tractability of the results. CRRA utility function is another popular form used in the liter-
ature, however we were unable to evaluate the optimal control for it even in the mean field
case.
Proof. The dynamic programming principle tells us that the function
Φi(t, y) := sup
αi
E [Yi(T ) | Yi(t) = y]
where we take the supremum over all αi which are bounded and adapted on [t, T ], satisfies
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
∂Φi
∂t
(t, y) + sup
αi∈R
[
1
2
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
(1 + αj)ajk
∂2Φi
∂yj∂yk
(t, y)
+
N∑
j=1
[
hj(αj, r(t)) +
1
N
N∑
k=1
cjk(t)(yk − yj)
]∂Φi
∂yj
(t, y)
]
= 0,
(22)
with terminal condition Φi(T, y) = yi. We assume all αj, j 6= i, are already chosen. Try the
following Anzats, linear in yj:
(23) Φi(t, y) = gi0(t) +
N∑
j=1
gij(t)yj.
Because it is linear, the second-order derivatives in (22) turn out to be zero. Therefore, the only
term in (22) which needs to be maximized is h(αi, r(t)). The solution to this maximization
problem is given by the value α∗i from (21). This is a simple algebraic exercise; detailed
calculations are given in Lemma 7.3 in the Appendix.
The maximal value of hi(α, r(t)) is
(24) h∗i (t) := hi(α
∗
i (t), r(t)) =

r(t) + (µi−r(t))
2
2σ2i
, r(t) ≤ µi − σ2i ;
µi − 12σ2i , r(t) ≥ µi − σ2i ≥ 0;
µ2i
2σ2i
, µi ≤ σ2i .
This means that the ith bank chooses the control value αi := α
∗
i . This value is independent
of terminal time T , and of the values of Yj, j = 1, . . . , N . This corresponds to the classical
solution of the Merton problem. If r is constant (independent of t), then α∗i and h
∗
i are also
constant. Comparing (23) with the terminal condition, we have:
(25) gij(T ) = δij =
{
1, i = j;
0, i 6= j, for j = 0, . . . , N.
Next, plug the anzats (23) into (22). Note that all second-order derivatives of the anzats (23)
are equal to zero, and first-order derivatives are
(26)
∂Φi
∂yj
= gij(t), j = 1, . . . , N.
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In addition, the time derivative of this value function Φ from (23) is
(27)
∂Φ
∂t
= g′i0(t) +
N∑
j=1
g′ij(t)yj.
Combining (21), (24), (26), (27), we get that the HJB equation (22) takes the form
(28) g′i0(t) +
N∑
j=1
g′ij(t)yj +
N∑
j=1
h∗j(t)gij(t) +
1
N
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
cjk(t)(yk − yj)gij(t) = 0.
Comparing coefficients in (28) at each yj, we see that
(29) g′ij(t) +
1
N
N∑
k=1
gik(t)cjk(t)− 1
N
N∑
k=1
gik(t)ckj(t) = 0, j = 1, . . . , N.
The free terms in (28) sum up to
(30) g′i0(t) +
N∑
j=1
h∗j(t)gij(t) = 0.
Together with terminal conditions (25), this system (29) and (30) of N + 1 linear ODEs has
a unique solution gi0, . . . , giN . This solves the HJB equation.
To complete the proof, let us do the verification argument. Take a bounded adapted control
αj = (αj(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) for each j = 1, . . . , N . Apply Itoˆ’s formula for Φi(t, Y (t)):
dΦi(t, Y (t)) =
[
∂Φi
∂t
(t, Y (t)) +
1
2
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
(1 + αj(t))ajk
∂2Φi
∂yj∂yk
(t, Y (t))
+
N∑
j=1
[
hj(αj(t), r(t)) +
1
N
N∑
k=1
cjk(t)(Yk(t)− Yj(t))
]∂Φi
∂yj
(t, Y (t))
]
dt
+
N∑
j=1
∂Φi
∂yj
(t, Y (t))(1 + αj(t))dWj(t).
(31)
Using the boundedness of αj = (αj(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ), we get that the stochastic integral term
in (31) has expectation zero. Combining (22) with (31), we get that (Φi(t, Y (t)), t ≥ 0) is
a supermartingale for all admissible (adapted bounded) controls αi, but a martingale for the
control α∗i . Recall that Φi(T, y) = yi. Therefore, EΦi(0, Y (0)) ≥ EΦi(T, Y (T )) = EYi(T ),
with equality for the control α∗i . From here it immediately follows that α
∗
i is indeed the
optimal control. 
3.3. The dynamics of banks under their optimal investment choices. Under the
optimal control (21), the processes Yi, i = 1, . . . , N (we shall denote them by Y
∗
i ) satisfy the
following system of stochastic differential equations:
(32) dY ∗i (t) = dM
∗
i (t) +
1
N
[
N∑
j=1
cij(t)(Y
∗
j (t)− Y ∗i (t))
]
dt, i = 1, . . . , N,
where M∗1 , . . . ,M
∗
N , are given by
dM∗i (t) = hi(α
∗
i (t), r(t))dt+ σi(1 + α
∗
i (t)) dWi(t).
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If r = const, then M∗ is an N -dimensional Brownian motion with drift vector and covariance
matrix given by
(33) µ∗ = (µ∗1, . . . , µ
∗
N), µ
∗
i := hi(α
∗
i , r).
(34) A∗ := (a∗ij)i,j=1,...,N = diag((1 + α
∗
i )
2, i = 1, . . . , N)A.
The dynamics (32) is similar to that in [8]. If r(t) does not depend on t, then M∗ =
(M∗1 , . . . ,M
∗
N)
′ , like (M1, . . . ,MN)′, is an N -dimensional Brownian motion, but with different
drift vector and covariance matrix. As in (2), we define
Y
∗
(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y ∗i (t).
Averaging equations (32) and using the symmetry property cij = cji, we have:
(35) Y
∗
(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
M∗i (t),
The interest rate r controls the overall size of the system, measured by Y . Express (35) as:
(36) dY
∗
(t) = g(r(t)) dt+ ρ(r(t)) dW (t),
where W is a standard Brownian motion, and the coefficients g(·) and ρ(·) are defined as:
(37) g(r) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
gi(r), gi(r) :=

(µi−r)2
2σ2i
+ r, r ≤ µi − σ2i ;
µi − σ
2
i
2
, r ≥ µi − σ2i ;
µ2i
2σ2i
, µi < σ
2
i .
(38) ρ2(r) :=
1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
aijρi(r)ρj(r), ρi(r) :=

µi−r
σ2i
, 0 ≤ r ≤ µi − σ2i ;
1, 0 ≤ µi − σ2i ≤ r;
µi
σ2i
, µi ≤ σ2i .
(a) r = 0 (b) r = 0.12 (c) r = 0.20
Figure 1. We use the following parameters for the simulations: N = 30 bank, time
horizon T = 1, no correlation ρ0 = 0, no interbank flows ci,j = 0, 1000 time steps
and µi, σi, i = 1, . . . , N i.i.d. uniform [0.1, 0.2]
To illustrate the optimal choice of the investment ratio α∗i = αi, i = 1, . . . , N , we made
some simulations. Take N = 30 banks, with µi, σi, i = 1, . . . , N i.i.d. uniform [0.1, 0.2]. Then
µi ≥ σ2i for all i; that is, all portfolios are profitable to invest, at least for zero interest rate
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r = 0. First, in Figure 1 we assume (10), that is, the portfolio processes S1, . . . , SN , are
independent. We also assume that there are no flows:
cij(t) ≡ 0, i, j = 1, . . . , N.
We take three interest rates r: 0%, 12%, and 20% respectively. As expected, increasing the
interest rate forces the banks to borrow less and thus optimal investment ratio α∗ becomes 0
in Figure 1(C) while it varied between 2 to 12 in Figure 1(A).
(a) All the banks (b) i = 1, . . . , 10 (c) j =
11, . . . , 30
Figure 2. Evolution of the logarithmic capital Yi(t) of banks, i = 1, . . . , N . We use
the following parameters: interest rate r = 0, N = 30 banks, time horizon T = 1, no
correlation: ρ0 = 0, interbank flows ci,j are as in equation (39) , 1000 time steps, and
µi, σi, i = 1, . . . , N are i.i.d. uniform on [0.1, 0.2]
(a) All the banks (b) i = 1, . . . , 10 (c) i = 11, . . . , 30
Figure 3. Evolution of the logarithmic capital of banks Yi(t).We use the following
parameters: interest rate r = 8%, N = 30 banks, time horizon T = 1, correlation
coefficient ρ0 = 0.5, interbank flows ci,j as in equation (39) , 1000 time steps and
µi, σi, i = 1, . . . , N i.i.d. uniform [0.1, 0.2]
Next, in Figure 2 we assume that the portfolio processes are independent, as in (10), but
there are flows:
(39) cij =
{
10, i, j = 1, . . . , 10;
0.5, else.
We observe that the banks with significant flows tend to have wealth dynamics which are
more “tied” together. Moreover, this adds to the stability to the system as we observe lesser
defaults for i = 1, . . . , 10 compared to j = 11, . . . , 30.
Finally, in Figure 3 we assume that the portfolio processes are correlated, as in (11), with
ρ0 := 0.5, flows are given by (39) and interest rate r is 8%. Compared to Figure 2, the impact
of correlation on the dynamics of the banks is clearly visible through movement of the wealth
dynamics strongly tied together.
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3.4. Systemic risk. Much of current research is devoted to systemic risk, that is, the prob-
ability of multiple bank defaults, and propagation of defaults through the system (in other
words, contagion). To illustrate the probability of default of banks under different scenarios,
we present the histogram and the empirical cumulative distribution function for number of
defaults with N = 100 banks and 1000 simulations. We assume the default threshold D = −1
in logarithmic wealth. That is, firms default if Yi(t) < D for some t ∈ [0, T ]. Denote the
(random) number D of defaults:
(40) D :=
N∑
i=1
1
(
min
0≤t≤T
Yi(t) < D
)
,
First, in Figure 4 we assume no interbank flows and independent portfolio process under
different interest rate scenarios:
(a) r = 0 (b) r = 0.05 (c) r = 0.08
Figure 4. Number of banks in default, whose log capital Yi(t) at some time t ∈ [0, T ]
goes below D = −1. We use the following parameters: N = 100 banks, 1000 simula-
tions, no correlation: aij = σ
2
i δij, no interbank flows: cij = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , N , 100
time steps, and µi, σi, i = 1, . . . , N are i.i.d. uniform on [0.1, 0.2]
Figure 5. Empirical CDF of D, the number of banks in default, with N = 100
banks, 1000 simulations, µi = σi = 0.1 for i = 1, . . . , N
Next, in Figure 5 we present empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the
number of defaulted banks assuming correlated portfolios and no interbank flows for different
interest rates. The corresponding histogram is presented in figure 6. As stated in previous
studies, increase in correlation increases the probability of large defaults and at the same time
reducing the small default probabilities, similar to flocking behaviour in various biological
studies. So, in Figure 7 we present empirical estimates of P(D > 60) and P(D < 5), for
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N = 100 banks, as a function of the correlation between their portfolio process at different
interest rates. As expected, we observe the increase in probability of large and small default
as the correlation increases. However, increasing the interest rate reduces the probability of
large default at the expense of small default probability. Finally, in Figure 8 we present the
empirical CDF for the number of defaulted banks assuming correlated portfolio process and
constant interbank flows cij = a for i, j = 1, . . . , N , where a ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}. We observe that
interbank flows help stabilize the system and reduce the probability of default.
(a) r = 0 and ρ0 = 0 (b) r = 0 and ρ0 = 0.5
(c) r = 0.03 and ρ0 = 0.3 (d) r = 0.05 and ρ0 = 0.3
Figure 6. Histogram of the number of banks defaulting. We use the following pa-
rameters: N = 100 banks, 1000 simulations, µi = σi = 0.1 for i = 1, . . . , N , and no
interbank flows: cij = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , N
4. Optimal central bank policy
In this section, we assume that the central bank has to choose the interest rate r in an
optimal way, so that, after banks make their choice as in the previous section, optimal policy
choice is achieved. We assume that banks make optimal (for them) choices and we omit all
asterisks from notation of processes. This can be thought of as a principal’s problem within
the principal-agent problem framework. Let us now revisit the description of policymaking
by the central bank.
Its tool is the interest rate r, which the central bank uses to control the overall amount of
capital in the system, measured by the Y
∗
from (36). If the interest rate is low, the growth rate
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(a) Probability of a large
default: D > 60
(b) Probability of a small
default: D < 5
Figure 7. Empirical estimates of the probabilities of large and small defaults:
P(D > 60) and P(D < 5), respectively, as a function of correlation between port-
folio process ρ0 at different interest rates. We use the following parameters: N = 100
banks, 5000 simulations, µi = σi = 0.1 for i = 1, . . . , N , and interbank flow rates
cij = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , N
(a) ρ0 = 0.5 and r = 0 (b) ρ0 = 0.5 and r = 0.03
Figure 8. Empirical CDF of the number D of banks in default. We use the following
parameters: N = 100 banks, 1000 simulations, µi = σi = 0.1 for i = 1, . . . , N , and
constant interbank flows cij = a for i, j = 1, . . . , N , where a ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}
g(r) from (37) and the volatility ρ2(r) from (38) are large. A more risk-averse central bank
can choose therefore a larger r. One can apply a concave utility function to Y
∗
(t), and solve
the stochastic control problem for this r. In this section, we apply the exponential (CARA:
constant relative risk aversion) utility function to Y
∗
(t).
The private banks wish to maximize their expected logarithmic net worth Yi(t). In other
words, they have logarithmic utility U(x) := log x, which shows their aversion to risk. How-
ever, in terms of logarithmic capital, their utility function is linear. Now, if the central bank
was as risk-averse as private banks, she would also try to maximize
E(Y1(T ) + . . .+ YN(T )), or, alternatively, EY (T ),
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for a time horizon T > 0. Below, we show that the central bank would then choose zero
interest rate r = 0, because this would produce the same result as the private banks were
aiming for.
Now, suppose the central bank is even more risk-averse than private banks. This should
manifest itself in the utility function being concave (rather than linear) even in logarithmic
terms. Consider, for example, a commonly used exponential (CARA) utility function:
(41) Uλ(y) := −e−λy.
Assume the central bank maximizes expected terminal utility:
(42) sup
r
EUλ(Y (T )),
where the supremum in (42) is chosen over all bounded adapted controls r. We can alterna-
tively choose instead of (41) the utility function as
(43) Uλ(y) =
1
λ
(
1− e−λy) .
There is no difference between (41) and (43) when we try to maximize (42), but writing (43)
highlights the risk-aversion of the central bank. As λ ↓ 0, the function Uλ from (43) satisfies:
Uλ(y)→ y.
The commonly used absolute risk aversion is calculated for (43) as follows:
−U
′′
λ (y)
U ′λ(y)
= λ.
In other words, λ > 0 is the coefficient of risk aversion (of the central bank relative to private
banks). For λ = 0 the central bank is not risk-averse at all (at least not more than private
banks).
Theorem 4.1. An optimal interest rate r(t) for the problem (42) is given by a constant r = r∗
which maximizes the following expression:
(44) w(r, λ) := g(r)− λ
2
ρ2(r).
Remark 3. It is interesting to note that the optimal interest rate r does not depend on the
flow rates cij. This is because we measure the size of the system by the stochastic process
Y (t). This process satisfies a stochastic differential equation with coefficients independent of
cij. These coefficients do depend on the optimal controls α
∗
i . However, as we mentioned in
Remark 2, these optimal controls α∗i , in turn, do not depend on the flow rates, because of our
special choice of logarithmic utility function.
Proof. The HJB equation for the function
Φ(t, y) := sup
r
E
[
Uλ(Y (T )) | Y (t) = y
]
where the supremum is taken over all bounded adapted controls r = (r(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ), takes
the form
(45)
∂Φ
∂t
+ sup
r≥0
[
∂Φ
∂y
g(r) +
1
2
∂2Φ
∂y2
ρ2(r)
]
= 0,
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with terminal condition Φ(T, y) = Uλ(y). Try the following form:
(46) Φ(t, y) = f(t)Uλ(y).
From (46), we can calculate derivatives with respect to t and y:
(47)
∂Φ
∂t
= f ′(t)Uλ(y),
∂Φ
∂y
= −λΦ, ∂
2Φ
∂y2
= λ2Φ.
Plug (47) into (45). Because Φ < 0, we can rewrite (45) as
f ′(t) + f(t) · inf
r≥0
[
−λg(r) + λ
2
2
ρ2(r)
]
= 0.
This, in turn, is equivalent to
(48)
f ′(t)
λf(t)
= sup
r≥0
[
g(r)− λ
2
ρ2(r)
]
=: k0.
Since we have Φ(T, y) < 0 and Uλ(y) < 0, for compatibility we need to show that f(t) > 0 for
all t. From the terminal condition Φ(T, y) = Uλ(y) combined with (46), we have: f(T ) = 1.
The equation (48) can be written as f ′(t) = λk0f(t), which gives us f(t) = exp (λk0(t− T )).
Therefore, f(t) is positive.
Finally, let us do the verification argument to complete the proof. The idea is similar to the
verification argument in Theorem 3.1. Assume r∗ = (r∗(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) is our constant control
from (44), found from (45), and r = (r(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) is some other admissible (adapted
bounded) control. Apply the function Φ(t, ·) to the process Y . By Itoˆ’s formula,
dΦ(t, Y (t)) =
[
∂Φ
∂t
(t, Y (t)) +
∂Φ
∂y
(t, Y (t))g(r(t)) +
1
2
∂2Φ
∂y2
(t, Y (t))ρ2(r(t))
]
dt
+
∂Φ
∂y
(t, Y (t))ρ(r(t)) dW (t).
(49)
Comparing (45) with (49), we get that Φ(t, Y (t)) is a supermartingale for the control r, but a
martingale for the control r∗. Indeed, by boundedness of r(t), the expectation of the stochastic
integral in (49) is zero. Since Φ(T, y) = Uλ(y), we get: EUλ(Y (T )) = EΦ(T, Y (T )) ≤
EΦ(0, Y (0)), with equality for the control r∗. The result immediately follows from here. 
Let us find the r which corresponds to the maximum in the right-hand side of (48). This
depends on the structure of the vector g and the matrix A.
If µi ≤ σ2i for all i = 1, . . . , N , then all investments are too unprofitable to borrow money
for them. Then the interest rate policy cannot influence the behavior of private banks. This
corresponds to the case of the liquidity trap, when conventional monetary policy no longer
works. From now on until the end of this section, let us assume that all investments are
attractive:
µi ≥ σ2i , i = 1, . . . , N.
(3.a) Assume S1 = . . . = SN : all investments are the same. Then we have:
g1 = . . . = gn =: g, and σ1 = . . . = σN =: σ;
g(r)− λ
2
ρ2(r) =
{
(µ−r)2
2σ2
(1− λ), r ≤ µ− σ2;
µ− σ2
2
(1 + λ), r ≥ µ− σ2.
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The maximum is attained at r = 0 for
λ < λ∗ := 1− 2
( µ
σ2
+ 1
)−1
,
and at any r ≥ µ−σ2 for λ > λ∗. This has the following meaning: the case λ < λ∗ corresponds
to less risk-averse central bank, and in order to increase the total quantity of capital in the
system, it wishes to slash the interest rate to zero. For the case λ > λ∗, however, the central
bank is very risk-averse, and it increases the interest rate to prevent excessive borrowing and
overheating of the financial system.
(3.b) Independent portfolio process: aij = σ
2
i δij. Then
g(r)− λ
2
ρ2(r) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
gi(r)− λ
2N
σ2i ρ
2
i (r)
]
.
This function attains maximum:
at r = 0 for λ < λmin := N min
i=1,...,N
[
1− 2
(
µi
σ2i
+ 1
)−1]
,
at r = max
i=1,...,N
[
µi − σ2i
]
for λ > λmax := N max
i=1,...,N
[
1− 2
(
µi
σ2i
+ 1
)−1]
.
In the general case, we do not have an explicit form for the optimal r in case λ ∈ [λmin, λmax].
If µ1 = . . . = µN = µ and σ1 = . . . = σN = σ, we have λmin = λmax. Note that here the
central bank chooses expansionary monetary policy (zero interest rate r = 0) for larger values
of λ than in case (3.b). This has the following interpretation: If the portfolios of banks are
independent, then this creates diversification in the system and reduces risk. Therefore, even
a relatively risk-averse central bank (large λ) can pursue aggressive expansionary monetary
policy.
(3.c) Correlated portfolio process with same growth rates µ = µi and volatilities σ
2 = σ2i .
Assume the driving Brownian motions of these portfolio process are correlated as in (11).
After calculation , we get:
g(r) =
{
(µ−r)2
σ2
+ r, r ≤ µ− σ2;
µ− σ2
2
, r ≥ µ− σ2;
ρ2(t) := c
(
µ− r
σ
∧ σ
)2
, c := λ
(
N − 1
N
ρ0 +
1
N
)
.
Then we can find optimal r: this is
r∗ =
{
0, c < 1− 2 ( µ
σ2
− 1)−1 ;
µ− σ2, c > 1− 2 ( µ
σ2
− 1)−1 .
Note that for ρ0 = 1 we get case (3.a), and for ρ0 = 0 we get case (3.b). Case (3.c) is inter-
mediate: there is diversification between portfolios of private banks, but this diversification is
not complete. Therefore, a risk-averse central bank can pursue more expansionary monetary
policy than in Case (3.a), but less so than in Case (3.b).
To illustrate the impact of risk aversion λ on the optimal interest rate, we simulate three
scenarios. First, in Figure 9 we assume uncorrelated portfolio process, each with same mean
and volatility µi = σi = 0.1 for i = 1, . . . , N . This is Case (3.a), which is discussed above in
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(a) optimal interest rate (b) w(r, λ)
Figure 9. Optimal interest rate with N = 30 uncorrelated portfolio process: ρ0 = 0,
with µi = σi = 0.1 for i = 1, . . . , N
(a)
optimal
interest
rate
(b) w(r, λ) (c) µi − σ2i
Figure 10. Optimal interest rate with N = 30 uncorrelated assets. with mean and
standard deviation µi, σi, i = 1, . . . , N i.i.d uniform on [0.1, 0.2]
(a)
optimal
interest
rate
(b) w(r, λ) (c) µi − σ2i
Figure 11. Optimal interest rate with N = 30 portfolio process, with correlation
ρ0 = 0.8 and µi, σi, i = 1, . . . , N i.i.d uniform on [0.1, 0.2]
this section.
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Next, in Figure 10 we assume independent portfolio process but with mean and standard
deviation µi, σi, i = 1, . . . , N i.i.d uniform on [0.1, 0.2]. This is Case (3.b), which is discussed
above in this section. However, to our surprise, we observe the optimal interest rate to have
only one jump as we increase the risk aversion parameter λ.
Finally, in Figure 11 we assume correlated portfolio process with ρ0 = 0.8 and mean and
standard deviation µi, σi, i = 1, . . . , N drawn from i.i.d uniform [0.1, 0.2]. This is a generalized
version of Case (3.c) discussed above. We observe that due to correlation in the portfolio
process, even a relatively less risk averse central bank is forced to raise the interest rate.
5. Long-term stability
In this section, we analyze the long-term behavior of the centered process:
(50) Y˜ =
(
Y˜1, . . . , Y˜N
)
, Y˜i(t) = Yi(t)− Y (t), i = 1, . . . , N.
It takes values in the hyperplane Π := {y ∈ RN | y1 + . . . + yN = 0}. In other words, we are
trying to find whether log capitals of banks stay together as time t goes to infinity, or they
split into two or more “clouds”. A similar problem was posed in [1] and solved in [2] for rank-
based models of financial markets. In that paper, log capitalizations of stocks are modeled as
Brownian particles with drift and diffusion coefficients depending only on the current rank of
this particle relative to other particles. This class of systems, known also as first-order models
or competing Brownian particles, was a subject of much recent research.
The key parameters are rates cij of interbank cash flows. Under certain fairly general
conditions on these rates, the process (50) is ergodic: It has a unique statonary distribution;
and for any initial conditions, it converges to this distribution as t→∞. This section has two
results. Theorem 5.1 deals with the case of flow rates cij being time-independent: cij(t) ≡ cij.
Lemma 5.2 covers the general case.
Assume the central bank has already chosen the interest rate r = r∗, as above. Then Y is
a Brownian motion with drift coefficient g(r∗) and diffusion coefficient ρ2(r∗). We have:
(51) dYi(t) = dMi(t) +
1
N
N∑
j=1
cij(t) (Yj(t)− Yi(t)) dt, i = 1, . . . , N.
Here, the process: M = (M1, . . . ,MN) is an N -dimensional Brownian motion with drift
vector and covariance matrix µ∗ = (µ∗1, . . . , µ
∗
N) and A
∗ = (a∗ij)i,j=1,...,N from (33) and (34).
The centered process (50) satisfies the SDE
(52) dY˜i(t) = dM˜i(t) +
1
N
N∑
j=1
cij(t)
(
Y˜j(t)− Y˜i(t)
)
dt, i = 1, . . . , N.
Here, M˜i(t) := Mi(t) −M(t) for i = 1, . . . , N . Note that M˜ = (M˜1, . . . , M˜N) is a Π-valued
Brownian motion. It has drift vector
(53) µ˜∗ = (µ˜∗1, . . . , µ˜
∗
N)
′, µ˜∗i := µ
∗
i − µ∗, µ∗ :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
µ∗i
and covariance matrix
(54) A˜∗ = (a˜∗ij) := V A
∗V, V = IN −N−1ee′, e = (1, . . . , 1)′ ∈ RN .
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Therefore, Y˜ is a Markov process. Denote by P t(x, ·) its transition function. Define the
following measure norm on Π for a function V : Π→ [1,∞):
‖ν‖V := sup
|f |≤V
∣∣∣∣∫
Π
fdν
∣∣∣∣ .
We denote the Euclidean norm of a vector x = (x1, . . . , xd)
′ ∈ Rd by
‖x‖ := [x21 + . . .+ x2d]1/2 .
Theorem 5.1. Assume the flow rates cij(t) = cij are constant. Define the graph G on the set
of vertices {1, . . . , N}: i↔ j iff cij > 0. If G is connected, then:
(a) Y˜ has a unique stationary distribution pi on Π, which is multivariate normal;
(b) the transition function satisfies for some constants c, λ, k > 0:
(55) ‖P t(x, ·)− pi(·)‖V ≤ cV (x)e−kt, V (x) := exp
(
λ
2
‖x‖2
)
;
(c) for any bounded measurable function f : Π→ R we have, a.s.:
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
f(Y˜ (s)) ds =
∫
Π
f(y)pi(dy).
Proof. From the properties of solutions of SDE and nondegeneracy of the covariance matrix
A˜∗ of M , we have the following positivity property:
(56) P t(x,C) > 0 for all t > 0, x ∈ Π, C ⊆ Π with mesΠ(C) > 0.
The generator of Y˜ for all twice continuously differentiable functions f : Π→ R is given by:
(57) Lf(x) :=
[
µ˜∗ +
1
N
Mx
]
· ∇f + 1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
a˜∗ij
∂2f
∂xi∂xj
.
Here, M = (mij)i,j=1,...,N is the following matrix:
(58) mij =
cij, i 6= j;−∑
k 6=i
cik, i = j.
Now, plug this function V from (55) for a suitable λ into the generator (57). Then
(59) ∇V = λxV, ∂
2V
∂xi∂xj
=
(
λ2xixj + λδij
)
V.
Combining (59) with (57), we get:
(60) LV =
[(
λµ˜∗ · x+ λ
N
x′Mx
)
+
1
2
(
λ2(x′A˜∗x) + λ tr(A˜∗)
)]
V.
Using Lemma 7.4 below, we get:
(61)
1
N
[x′Mx] ≤ −c0‖x‖2, c0 := c(M)
N
.
There exists a constant a0 > 0 such that for all x ∈ Π, we have: x′A˜∗x ≤ a0‖x‖2. Combining
this observation with (60) and (61), we get:
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(62) LV ≤
[
λµ˜∗ · x− λc0‖x‖2 + 1
2
a0λ
2‖x‖2 + 1
2
λ tr(A˜∗)
]
V.
Choose λ := c0/a0, then (62) takes the form
(63) LV (x) ≤ K(x)V (x), K(x) := c0
a0
µ˜∗ · x− c
2
0
2a20
‖x‖2 + 1
2
c0
a0
tr(A˜∗).
Note that, as ‖x‖ → ∞, we have: K(x)→ −∞. Therefore, for some constants c1, c2 > 0,
(64) K(x) ≤ −c1, ‖x‖ ≥ c2.
Recall the definition of the ball B(c2) in (6). Since LV and V are continuous, we have:
(65) max
x∈B(c2)
[LV (x) + c1V (x)] =: c3 <∞.
Combining (63) with (64) and (65), we get:
(66) LV (x) ≤ −c1V (x) + c31B(c2)(x).
Finally, combine (66) with the Feller property of Y˜ (i.e. for a bounded continuous function f,
the map x 7→ P tf(x) is also bounded and continuous for the transition function P of Y˜ ), and
with the positivity property (56). Apply Lemma 7.1 from Appendix to Lebesgue reference
measure ψ and the function V from (55). This completes the proof of (a) (the uniqueness
of a stationary distribution), as well as of (b). The fact that this stationary distribution pi
is multivariate normal follows from the observation that Y˜ is a multidimensional Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process on the hyperplane Π.
To finish the proof of Theorem 5.1, let us show (c): This is similar to the proof of [2,
Theorem 1]. Take any r ≥ c2. Adjusting the proof of (66) above, we find that there exists a
positive constant d(r) such that
LV (x) ≤ −c1V (x) + d(r)1B(r)(x).
Let τB(r) := inf{t ≥ 0 | Y˜ (t) ∈ B(r)} be the hitting moment of the ball B(r), for a fixed r > 0.
Apply [24, Theorem 4.3(a)], with the function V from (55), with f := 1, δ := 0. Then
ExτB(r) ≤ c−11 V (x), x ∈ Π.
Use the fact that V is bounded on compact subsets to verify assumption (b) in Lemma 7.2.
Assumption (a) of this lemma follows from the observation that the covariance matrix of Y˜ is
constant. Now apply Lemma 7.2 from [19, Theorem 4.1, Theorem 4.2], cited as [2, Proposition
1]. This completes the proof of part (c) of Theorem 5.1. 
Lemma 5.2. Assume the flow rates are given by
cij(t) = cijf(Y˜ (t)), i, j = 1, . . . , N, i 6= j; t ≥ 0,
where f : Π→ R is a function such that
lim
‖z‖→∞
f(z) > 0,
and cij are real numbers as in Theorem 5.1. Then the conclusion of Theorem 5.1 is the same,
minus the conclusion that pi is multivariate normal.
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Proof. Similar to Theorem 5.1, but with the following changes: Instead of (60), we have:
LV (x) =
[
λµ˜∗ · x+ λf(x)
N
x′Mx+ 1
2
(
λ2(x′A˜∗x) + λ tr(A˜∗)
)]
V.
There exist c4, c5 > 0 such that f(x) ≥ c4 for x ∈ Π, ‖x‖ ≥ c5. Therefore, for such x, the
estimate (63) is preserved with c0 changed to c0c4. The rest of the proof is similar to that of
Theorem 5.1. 
Note, however, that if the graph G is disconnected, then this stability breaks down. Indeed,
assume G has connected components G1 and G2 (only two for sake of notational simplicity;
analysis is the same for more than two connected components), and the flow rates cij are
positive constants if i and j are adjacent, cij = 0 if not. By Theorem 5.1, we get:
(Yi − Y 1)i∈G1 , (Yi − Y 2)i∈G2
are ergodic, that is, they satisfy an inequality similar to (55). Here,
(67) Y 1(t) :=
1
|G1|
∑
i∈G1
Yi(t), Y 2(t) :=
1
|G2|
∑
i∈G2
Yi(t).
But these averages from (67) are, in fact, Brownian motions with certain drift and diffusion
coefficients, which are easy to calculate from (51). They are correlated, but not perfectly.
Therefore, Y 1 − Y 2 is not ergodic, and the process Y˜ defined in (50) is also not ergodic.
Private banks are separated into two groups, which “drift” from each other.
6. Concluding remarks
We studied a model of N private banks exchanging money through interbank flows, bor-
rowing from the general economy under an interest rate set by the central bank, and investing
in portfolios consisting of risky assets; these portfolios are modeled by correlated geometric
Brownian motions. This represents an enhancement of the model (1), which is obtained in [8]
as a result of banks borrowing from each other. We generalize the interbank flows from [8],
making them heterogeneous.
Each private bank maximizes its expected terminal logarithmic utility. The central bank
maximizes exponential utility function of the total size of the system. We are able to solve the
control problems for each private banks and the central bank because of this special choice of
utility functions. The resulting dynamics looks a bit like (1), except that each private bank
has its own growth rate and volatility in the driving Brownian motion, and the flow rates cij
depend on i and j.
Our setup allowed us to study systemic risk and distribution of defaults under different
market and investment scenarios. We also observe common economic phenomena of liquidity
trap (where the monetary policy fails to boost the investment in risky assets) naturally arising
from the model.
For future research, one can consider the case when some but not all portfolios Si satisfy
µi ≤ σ2i (and are therefore unprofitable). In addition, it might be interesting to consider
different utility functions for private banks, for example power utility. Since the corresponding
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations are likely to be intractable, the problem might be analyzed
using mean-field formulation, each bank is competing against the “mass of banks”.
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7. Appendix
Let us state explicitly convergence results for general continuous-time Markov processes,
used in the proof of Theorem 5.1. These results from classic papers [12, 23, 24] link Lyapunov
functions with long-term convergence. In [26, Lemma 2.3, Theorem 2.6], we reformulate these
results to make them more convenient for our use. Let us restate these results here, for
convenience of the reader.
Lemma 7.1. Take a Feller continuous strong Markov process X = (X(t), t ≥ 0) on the metric
state space E, with transition function P t(x, ·), and generator L. Denote by Px the probability
measure under which X(0) = x. Assume for some positive reference measure ψ and a function
V : E → [1,∞) in the domain D(L) of the generator L, we have:
(a) for some compact subset C ⊆ E, we have ψ(C) > 0;
(b) for all ψ-positive subsets A ⊆ E, x ∈ E, t > 0, we have: P t(x,A) > 0.
(c) for some constants b, k > 0 and a compact set K ⊆ E, we have:
LV (x) ≤ −kV (x) + b1K(x), x ∈ E ; and sup
x∈K
V (x) <∞.
Then there exists a unique stationary distribution pi, and the transition function satisfies the
following estimate: for some constants D,κ > 0,
‖P t(x, ·)− pi(·)‖V ≤ DV (x)e−κt, x ∈ E , t ≥ 0.
The following Strong Law of Large Numbers is taken from [19, Theorem 4.1, Theorem 4.2].
It holds under an assumption which can be called uniform positive recurrence, and which
can be deduced from existence of Lyapunov functions. Assume that E = Rd above, and X
is the solution of an SDE with a certain drift vector, and the covariance matrix A(·). Let
τC := inf{t ≥ 0 | X(t) ∈ C} be the hitting time of a subset C ⊆ Rd. Assume there exists a
unique stationary distribution pi.
Lemma 7.2. Assume for some open bounded domain D ⊆ E with C2 boundary, we have:
(a) the smallest eigenvalue of A(x) for x ∈ D is uniformly bounded away from zero;
(b) for every compact subset K ⊆ Rd, we have: sup
x∈K
ExτD <∞.
Then Px-a.s. for every x ∈ Rd and bounded measurable function f : Rd → R, we have:
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
f(X(t)) dt =
∫
Rd
f(x)pi(dx).
Lemma 7.3. Fix µ ∈ R and σ > 0. Take a function h : R→ R, defined as
h(x) = µx− σ
2
2
x2 − r(x− 1)+.
Its global maximum is reached at the point x∗ and is equal to h∗ = h(x∗), where:
h(x∗) :=

r + (µ−r)
2
2σ2
, µ− σ2 ≥ r;
µ− σ2
2
, 0 ≤ µ− σ2 ≤ r;
µ
2σ2
, µ ≤ σ2.
x∗ :=

µ−r
σ2
, µ− σ2 ≥ r;
1, 0 ≤ µ− σ2 ≤ r;
µ
σ2
, µ ≤ σ2.
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Proof. We can write
h(x) =
{
µx− σ2
2
x2 − r(x− 1), x ≥ 1;
µx− σ2
2
x2, x ≤ 1.
First, note that the function h is smooth everywhere except x = 1, and h′′(x) < 0 for all
x 6= 1. Therefore, if h′(x) = 0, then h has a local maximum at x. Take derivatives on both
intervals (−∞, 1] and [1,∞):
x ≥ 1 implies h′(x) = (µ− r)− σ2x = 0 =⇒ x = x1 := µ− r
σ2
;
x ≤ 1 implies h′(x) = µ− σ2x = 0 =⇒ x = x2 := µ
σ2
.
On both these rays, h is a parabola with branches facing down.
Case 1. µ−σ2 ≥ r. Then x1, x2 ≥ 1. Therefore, h reaches maximum on [1,∞) at x1, and on
(−∞, 1] at 1. Since h reaches its maximum on [1,∞) at x1 and not 1, we have: h(1) ≤ h(x1).
As a result, x∗ = x1.
Case 2. 0 ≤ µ−σ2 ≤ r. Then x1 ≤ 1, but x2 ≥ 1. Therefore, h reaches maximum on [1,∞)
at 1, and on (−∞, 1] at 1. As a result, the global maximum will be at x∗ = 1.
Case 3. µ − σ2 ≤ 0. Then x1, x2 ≤ 1. Therefore, h reaches maximum on [1,∞) at 1, and
on (−∞, 1] at x = x2. Similarly to Case 1, the global maximum is reached at x∗ = x2. 
Lemma 7.4. For the matrix M defined in (58), there exists a constant c(M) > 0 such that
(68) x′Mx ≤ −c(M)‖x‖2, x ∈ Π.
Proof. Note thatM is a generator matrix for a continuous-time Markov chain Q = (Q(t), t ≥
0) on {1, . . . , N}. This Markov chain can be viewed as a biased random walk on the graph G:
As it wants to jump out of a state i, it chooses one of its nearest neighbors j, such that i and
j are connected, only not with uniform probability. This graph G is connected. Therefore,
this Markov chain is irreducible. Since it is finite, it is positive recurrent. From the standard
results on continuous-time Markov chains, see for example [18, Theorem 2.7.15], this Markov
chain Q has a unique stationary distribution
piQ =
[
piQ1 . . . pi
Q
N
]
This stationary distribution satisfies piQM = 0. But the columns of the matrixM sum up to
zero. Therefore, e′M = 0, and e/N is a stationary distribution. By uniqueness, piQ = e/N .
Let λ1, . . . λN and v1, . . . , vN be the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix M
(69) Mvi = λivi, i = 1, . . . , N.
The eigenvectors of the matrix M are all real, because M is symmetric. Next, nonzero
eigenvalues are negative: This follows from [17, Exercise 8.1]. Each zero eigenvalue λi has
eigenvector vi which satisfies v
′
iM = 0, that is, v′i is proportional to a stationary distribution.
But the stationary distribution is unique, so we have (without loss of generality):
λ1 = 0; λ2, . . . , λN < 0; v1 = ce for some constant c.
Now, take an x ∈ RN . Assume v1, . . . , vN are normalized: ‖vi‖ = 1, i = 1, . . . , N . Because
M is symmetric, v1, . . . , vN form an orthonormal basis in RN . Therefore, we can decompose
(70) x = (x · v1)v1 + (x · v2)v2 + . . .+ (x · vN)vN .
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For a vector x ∈ Π, we have: x · e = 0, and therefore x · v1 = 0. Thus, (70) takes the form
(71) x = (x · v2)v2 + . . .+ (x · vN)vN .
Apply the matrix M to this vector in (71) and use (69). We have:
(72) Mx = (x · v2)λ2v2 + . . .+ (x · vN)λNvN .
From (71) and (72), since v1, . . . , vN form an orthonormal basis of RN , we have:
(73) x′Mx =Mx · x = λ2(x · v2)2 + . . .+ λN(x · vN)2.
In addition, multiplying (71) by itself, we get:
(74) ‖x‖2 = x · x = (x · v2)2 + . . .+ (x · vN)2.
Let c(M) := min (|λ2|, . . . , |λN |) > 0. Comparing (73) and (74), we get (68). 
References
[1] Adrian D. Banner, E. Robert Fernholz, Ioannis Karatzas (2005) Atlas Models of Equity Mar-
kets. Ann. Appl. Probab. 15 (4), 2996–2330.
[2] Adrian D. Banner, E. Robert Fernholz, Tomoyuki Ichiba, Ioannis Karatzas, Vassilios
Papathanakos (2011). Hybrid Atlas Models. Ann. Appl. Probab. 21 (2), 609–644.
[3] Lijun Bo, Agnostino Capponi (2015). Systemic Risk in Interbanking Networks. SIAM J. Fin. Math.
6 (1), 386–424.
[4] Agostino Capponi, Xu Sun, David Yao (2018). A Dynamic Network Model of Interbank Lending -
Systemic Risk and Liquidity Provisioning. Available at SSRN:3028417,
[5] Rene Carmona (2017). Lectures on BSDEs, Stochastic Control, and Stochastic Differential Games with
Financial Applications. SIAM Press.
[6] Rene Carmona, Francois Delarue, Daniel Lacker (2017). Mean-Field Games of Timing and
Models for Bank Runs. Appl. Math. Opt. 76 (1), 217–260.
[7] Rene Carmona, Jean-Pierre Fouque, Seyyed Mostafa Mousavi, Li-Hsien Sun (2016). Systemic
Risk and Stochastic Games with Delay. Available at arXiv:1607.06373.
[8] Rene Carmona, Jean-Pierre Fouque, Li-Hsien Sun (2013). Mean-Field Games and Systemic Risk.
Available at arXiv:1308.2172.
[9] Rene Carmona, Francois Delarue, Daniel Lacker (2016). Mean Field Games with Common
Noise. Ann. Probab. 44 (6), 3740–3803.
[10] Rene Carmona, Daniel Lacker (2015). A Probabilistic Weak Formulation of Mean Field Games and
Applications. Ann. Appl. Probab. 25 (3), 1189–1231.
[11] Douglas W. Diamond, Philip H. Dyvbig (1983). Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity. J.
Polit. Econ. 91 (3), 401–419.
[12] Douglas Down, Sean P. Meyn, Richard L. Tweedie (1995). Exponential and Uniform Ergodicity
for Markov Processes. Ann. Probab. 23 (4), 1671–1691.
[13] David Feldman (1992). Logarithmic Preferences, Myopic Decisions, and Incomplete Information. J.
Fin. Quant. Anal. 27 (4), 619-629.
[14] Jean-Pierre Fouque, Tomoyuki Ichiba (2013). Stability in a Model of Interbank Lending. SIAM J.
Fin. Math. 4 (1), 784–803.
[15] Jean-Pierre Fouque, Joseph A. Langsam (2013). Handbook of Systemic Risk. Cambridge University
Press.
[16] Josselin Garnier, George Papanicolaou, Tzu-Wei Yang (2013). Large Deviations for a Mean
Field Model of Systemic Risk. SIAM J. Fin. Math. 4 (1), 151–184.
[17] Marius Iosifescu (2007). Finite Markov Processes and Their Applications. Dover.
[18] Mark Kelbert, Yuri Suhov (2008). Probability and Statistics by Example II. Markov Chains: a
Primer in Random Processes and Their Applications. Cambridge University Press.
[19] Rafail Khasminskii (2012). Stochastic Stability of Differential Equations. Stochastic Modeling and Ap-
plied Probability 66, Springer.
INTERBANK FLOWS, BORROWING, AND INVESTING 27
[20] Oliver Kley, Claudia Kluppelberg, Lukas Reichel (2015). Systemic Risk Through Contagion
in a Core-Periphery Structured Banking Network. Advances in Mathematics of Finance, edited by A.
Palczewski and L. Stettner. Banach Center Publications.
[21] Daniel Lacker (2016). A General Characterization of the Mean Field Limit for Stochastic Differential
Games. Probab. Th. Rel. Fields 165 (3), 581–648.
[22] Daniel Lacker, Thaleia Zariphopoulou (2017). Mean Field and n-Agent Games for Optimal In-
vestment under Relative Performance Criteria. Available at arXiv:1703.07685.
[23] Sean P. Meyn, Richard L. Tweedie (1993). Stability of Markovian Processes II: Continuous-Time
Processes and Sampled Chains. Adv. Appl. Probab. 25 (3), 487–517.
[24] Sean P. Meyn, Richard L. Tweedie (1993). Stability of Markovian Processes III: Foster-Lyapunov
Criteria for Continuous-Time Processes. Adv. Appl. Probab. 25 (3), 518–548.
[25] Sergey Nadtochiy, Mykhaylo Shkolnikov (2017). Particle Systems with Singular Interaction
Through Hitting Times: Application in Systemic Risk Modeling. Available at arXiv:1705.00691.
[26] Andrey Sarantsev (2016). Reflected Brownian Motion in a Convex Polyhedral Cone: Tail Estimates
for the Stationary Distribution. J. Th. Probab. 30 (3), 1200-1223.
[27] Li-Hsien Sun (2017). Systemic Risk and Interbank Lending. Available at arXiv:1611.06672.
Department of Statistics and Applied Probability, University of California, Santa Barbara
E-mail address: aditya maheshwari@ucsb.edu
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Nevada, Reno
E-mail address: asarantsev@unr.edu
